133 Policy & Politics vol 39 no 1 • 133–43 (2011) • 10.1332/ 030557310X550114 DEBATEDEBATEDEBATE Key words: secrecy • national security • public interest • public consent • spying © The Policy Press, 2011 • ISSN 0305 5736 Diplomacy and the ethics of spying: Blair, Iraq and the art of government Cris Shore Introduction The conceptual theme explored in this article concerns what might be termed the ‘occult practices’ of government – those hidden aspects of government that are offcially denied or shrouded by ritual and taboo – and what happens when those taboos are broken. Among the questions that have long intrigued political anthropologists is the relationship between policy discourse and the manufacture of consent. Put simply, how are policies discursively managed to control public debate and to ensure particular outcomes? Power, as Foucault has cogently demonstrated (1977; 1980) typically disguises the mechanisms of its own operation. However, power is also most effective when its ideological character is made to appear self-evident, ‘natural’ and ‘beyond question’, or what Bourdieu (1977) termed ‘doxa’. The case study I use to examine these arguments is the scandal that erupted in February 2004 following disclosures that British security services were spying on the United Nations (UN) before a crucial vote over war on Iraq. Although that episode was subsequently eclipsed by other events (including allegations that the dossier used to justify invading Iraq had been ‘sexed up’ and the suicide of Ministry of Defence biological weapons adviser, Dr David Kelly), the story has particular signifcance for policy analysis and understanding how states operate ‘back stage’. My argument is in three steps. First I trace how the scandal developed; second, I examine the reactions it provoked and the attempts to bring semantic closure to the debate; and third, I analyse what these events reveal about diplomacy and government in contemporary Britain. Case study: spying on the UN Events surrounding the ‘UN-bugging controversy’ are well known. They included the widely held view that the legal case for war had been ‘stitched up’; the sudden change of mind of Britain’s Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, who had previously endorsed the Foreign Offce advice that without a second UN resolution, war on Iraq would be illegal; the resignation of Foreign and Commonwealth Offce Deputy Legal Adviser, Elizabeth Wilmhurst, the day war was declared; and growing unease Delivered by Ingenta to: Guest User IP : 185.14.194.135 On: Mon, 06 Jun 2016 14:49:53 Copyright The Policy Press