......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... doi:10.1017/S1049096519001781 © American Political Science Association, 2019 PS • April 2020 243 Politics Hitting Two Birds with One Stone: How Russian Countersanctions Intertwined Political and Economic Goals Paulina Pospieszna, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland Joanna Skrzypczyńska, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland Beata Stępień, Poznan University of Economics and Business, Poland ABSTRACT This article explicates the intertwined economic and political goals behind the imposition of countersanctions through an analysis of their premises and outcomes for Russia’s domestic economy. The evidence supports the argument that retaliation was designed to benefit the Russian domestic food industry, reorient trade relations, and bol- ster domestic public support for this sector while politically penalizing sanctioning coun- tries. An important contribution of this article is to demonstrate how sanctions imposed on nondemocratic target countries, which play an important role in international affairs, is like a tit-for-tat game, which may have additional effects and also unintended political, economic, and social consequences not yet observed. I nternational sanctions on Russia were imposed in March 2014 and again in July 2014 as a reaction to Russia’s annex- ation of Crimea and involvement in the armed confict in southeast Ukraine. The declared purpose was the return of Crimea to Ukraine and the revision of Russian foreign pol- icy. The measures chosen by the United States and the European Union (EU) included individual measures, such as an asset freeze and a travel ban, as well as sectorial measures related to fnance, defense, and oil sectors. It was clear from the beginning that diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia were intended to discredit Russian pol- iticians, elites, and entities involved in the confict; to express disapproval of Russian activities in Ukraine; and possibly to con- strain Russian expansion in the region. 1 Since March 2014, the sanctions have been renewed and amended numerous times. The European Council agreed to link the duration of the sanctions to the complete implementation of the agreements 2 to halt the war in the Donbas region of Ukraine, which were agreed to after talks in Minsk under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Several more countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Montenegro, Albania, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—aligned with some of the EU’s measures. 3 In response to sanctions imposed by the West, Russia retal- iated with diplomatic measures against US, Canadian, and EU ofcials (O’Kane 2014; Russia Today 2015) and subsequently by Resolution No. 830 of the Government of the Russian Federation, which introduced a food embargo in the form of an import ban from countries imposing economic sanctions against Russia. The import ban encompassed meat, fsh, seafood, milk and some dairy products, vegetables, fruits, and nuts. Russia’s countersanctions might have puzzled political sci- entists and economists because surprisingly little attention has been given to how governments on the receiving end of puni- tive economic measures react. Have countersanctions had any relevance for broader domestic-policy goals? What type of fac- tors played a role in determining the Russian use of sanctions in response to those imposed by the West? Analysis of how the Russian government specifically designed its countersanction policy can shed more light on understanding the objectives behind countersanctions. Recent studies examined the efects of countersanctions insti- tuted by Russia and found that it was a carefully crafted meas- ure to infict greater economic damage on some states as well as to support its political goals (Hedberg 2018; Kazun 2016; Mau 2016; Wengle 2016). We contribute to this research specifcally by explicating the political and economic logic of those countersanc- tions through analysis of their premises and efects on Russia. We argue that countersanctions can be strategically designed to accomplish a number of distinct objectives: they can maximize economic losses across all coalition members under sanctions, and they can be designed so that the disruptive impact is felt Paulina Pospieszna is associate professor of political science at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. She can be reached at paulina.pospieszna@amu.edu.pl. Joanna Skrzypczyńska is assistant professor of political science at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. She can be reached at joanna.skrzypczynska@amu.edu.pl. Beata Stępień is professor of economics and business at Poznan University of Economics and Business, Poland. She can be reached at beata.stepien@ue.poznan.pl.