MEDICINA NEI SECOLI Journal of History of Medicine and Medical Humanities 34/2 (2022) 103-128 © Author (s) E-ISSN 2531-7288 ISSN 0394/9001 4.0 INTERNATIONAL Received: 19.11.2021 Accepted: 01.02.2022 DOI: 10.13133/2531-7288/2652 Corresponding author: Alexandre Erler alexandre.erler@philosophy.oxon.org Memory Erasure and the Objection from Truthfulness Alexandre Erler National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Taipei, Taiwan AbstrAct Memory Erasure and the Truthfulness Objection The prospect of selectively erasing undesired memories, wheth- er inducing trauma or “normal” negative affect, has long been explored in fction. Today, advances in biomedical science in- creasingly promise to turn it into reality. This article discusses one particular ethical concern about memory erasure, premised on the value of “truthful living”. After explaining memory eras- ure (alongside other forms of memory editing) and reviewing its current science, I lay out what I call the truthfulness objection. I then consider two main challenges to it: a skeptical take on the accuracy of autobiographical memories (which I critique), and a challenge to the normative force of truthfulness (which I partly endorse). After highlighting what I take to be the grain of truth in the objection, I conclude on a cautiously optimistic note, by highlighting some practical constraints that can be ex- pected to reduce the threat to truthfulness from memory erasure. Keywords: Autobiographical memory - Memory erasure - Neuroethics - Truth 1. Introduction: the ethical debate around memory editing “Memory editing” broadly refers to the process of alter- ing a person’s memories (other than by enhancing mem- ory capacity) using direct interventions into the brain, with a view to improving her well-being. Prospective interventions that would allow to either selectively erase painful memories, or to blunt their emotional impact, have generated a substantial literature in neuroethics over the past two decades. These interventions are primarily