JOURNAL OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE 35, 246–260 (1996) ARTICLE NO. 0014 Repeated Exposure to Suggestion and False Memory: The Role of Contextual Variability KAREN J. MITCHELL AND MARIA S. ZARAGOZA Kent State University Although it has been well established that a single exposure to suggestion can result in the creation of false memories for suggested events, little is known about the effects of repeated exposure to suggestion. Zaragoza and Mitchell (in press) demonstrated that repeated exposure to postevent suggestion increased subjects’ tendency to misremember witnessing the suggested information. The experiments presented here examined the possibility that increasing contextual variability between the repeated exposures would exacerbate this effect by impairing subjects’ ability to discriminate accurately the precise source of the suggested items. Results from two experiments show that increasing variability by changing surface features (i.e., modality) exagger- ated the deleterious effects of repeated exposure to suggestion. Increasing the spacing between exposures (Experiment 2), however, did not have the same effect.  1996 Academic Press, Inc. One of the obstacles people face when they ing experienced events that were never actu- attempt to remember a specific event is dis- ally experienced. It is now well established criminating between memories of the target that even single exposures to misinformation event and other related information in mem- can result in genuine false memories for sug- ory. For example, eyewitnesses who are called gested events (e.g., Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; to testify in a court of law must separate their Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; memories of the event they witnessed from Lindsay, 1990; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994; Zara- their own ruminations about the event as well goza & Mitchell, in press). This paper, how- as any pertinent information they may have ever, is concerned with illusory memories that acquired from other sources (e.g., newspaper result when people have been repeatedly ex- accounts of the event, new information posed to misleading suggestions about an gleaned from conversations with others). Oc- event they witnessed. casionally, people’s attempts to distinguish Interest in illusory memories is certainly not between related memories fail. A potential limited to the domain of eyewitness memory. consequence of such discrimination failures is For example, the possibility that people can an illusory recollection—a memory for hav- be led to create memories of events that never happened has been attracting considerable in- terest of late because of its relevance to the These experiments composed a thesis submitted by current recovered/false memory debate. At the Karen J. Mitchell in partial fulfillment of the requirements heart of this debate is the claim that the recent for the Master of Arts degree, Department of Psychology, Kent State University. This research was funded by Na- rash of alleged recovered memories of child- tional Institute of Mental Health Grant MH47858 to Maria hood abuse are in fact false memories induced S. Zaragoza. We thank Peggy Dombrowski, Sean Lane, by certain therapeutic practices (e.g., see Lind- John Mitchell, and Don Wolf for their patient help with say & Read, 1994; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994, stimuli preparation. We are grateful to Michelle Gilmour, Jeanine Raye, and Emily Roper for their assistance in for recent discussions of this claim). Like the collecting data. Address correspondence and reprint re- situation in which a witness is misled, the con- quests to Maria S. Zaragoza or Karen J. Mitchell, Depart- cern here is that a suggestion introduced re- ment of Psychology, Kent State University, Kent, OH peatedly by a third party might result in a 44242-0001. E-mail: mzaragoz@phoenix.kent.edu. or kmitchel@kentvm.kent.edu. false memory. In fact, it is this opportunity 246 0749-596X/96 $18.00 Copyright  1996 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.