PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE VOLUME 17, #4, WINTER, 1980 VALUES IN BEHAVIOR THERAPY WITH CHILDREN C. EUGENE WALKER,* STEPHEN MARK ULISSI AND STEVEN THURBER University of Oklahoma Medical School ABSTRACT: Values refer to judgments as to what is good and what is bad or what ought to be and what ought not to be. Psychotherapy is a process of social influence and cannot be value free. The stages of therapy are examined and guidelines are presented for making value judgments at each stage. DEFINITION The term "value" is difficult to define. Un- like denotatively explicit words {e.g., house, car), there is no definite, unambiguous refer- ent for "value." Consequently, the proffered definitions have been varied and often incon- sistent. For instance, Perry (1926) seems to equate values with interests: Allport (1961) refers to values as beliefs; and Tisdale (1961) calls them "inferred motivational con- structs." A common thread among various definitions seems to be the notion that values promote and/or guide activity (as emphasized in Tisdale's formulation). As a working definition, we propose that values refer to judgments (based on behavior- al, cognitive and affective appraisals) as to what is good (what ought to be) and what is bad (what ought to be avoided). Those things (ob- jects, facts, concepts, principles, assumptions, causes) judged good are preferred, will be ap- proached, and will be worked for by the indi- vidual. Conversely, those things judged bad are not preferred, will be avoided, and will not act as positive work incentives for the person making the value judgment. The child thera- pist with a behavioral orientation functions according to the dictum that what is valued is actually valuable, at least to the individual * Requests for reprints should be sent to C. Eugene Walker, University of Oklahoma, Department of Psychi- atry & Behavioral Sciences, Post Office Box 26901, 616 N.E. 15th Street, Oklahoma City. Oklahoma 73190. making the judgment. In working with children, the behavioral therapist functions within the value system espoused by the child and the child's caregiv- ers. What are the child's desires? What do the child and caregivers want changed? Most often, these expressed desires will be deemed desirable. That is, they will be congruent with the value system of the therapist and will con- stitute appropriate goals of therapy. Thus, a child wants more friends (desires the good of social reinforcement); a parent wants a diabe- tic child to follow a prescribed diet (desires the good of health maintenance and increased probability of survival); a teacher asks for help in reducing hyperactivity in an elemen- tary school student (which would lead to the good of increased social and symbolic rein- forcement for the child as well as preservation of a societal institution, the school). Occasionally, a therapist will find that what the child or caregivers desire is not, in the therapist's judgment, really desireable, i.e., there will be a conflict in values vis-a-vis the goals of therapy. As Zuriff(1980) has pointed out, a therapist confronted by such a value conflict may be at a major disadvantage. For example, Zuriff contends that the behavioral (i.e., Skinnerian) ethical system lacks a critical component: it cannot recommend a change in values. A girl who finds low food intake rein- forcing (and is classified as a case of anorexia nervosa) is engaging in what to her is a good activity. She ought to maintain low food inges- tion since such an event is reinforcing to her. A behavioral therapist, as this reasoning goes, cannot intervene and suggest a value change, since one reinforcer is no better or worse than another. Our contention is that the naturalist ethical system of the behaviorist can, in fact, yield recommendations for value changes. In the 431