International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science No. 6, Year 4/2020 https://ijtps.com/ ISSN 2601-1697, ISSN-L 2601-1689 IJTPS STUDIES AND ARTICLES © 2020 IFIASA Page | 68 https://doi.org/10.26520/ijtps.2020.4.6.68-81 THE RADICALIZATION PROGRAM OF PHENOMENOLOGY OF JEAN-LUC MARION PhD. Piotr KARPIŃSKI, Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Warsaw Higher Seminary in Łowicz, POLAND, Email: piotrkar@o2.pl ABSTRACT The article discusses the project of radicalization of phenomenology in Jean-Luc Marion. The very idea of radicalization has been associated with phenomenology since its origin and means a return to the main idea to study the appearance of phenomena, rethink it and draw the maximum consequences from it. Marion argues with Husserl and Heidegger, who, in his opinion, stopped halfway in the phenomenological path: the first reducing all phenomena to objects, the second reducing everything to being. Meanwhile, Marion is about freeing the phenomenon so that it appears on its own and as it is. In this purpose, he adopts the fundamental principle of phenomenology as “so much reduction, so much givenness”, which shows that he bases his project on two concepts: reduction and givenness. The next step is to develop the issue of givenness and describe phenomena in its light. Marion's precious discovery is the saturated phenomena, which are characterized by an excess of visibility relative to the concept. Marion's project is completed with an analysis of the gift and the subject. It should be noted that, despite polemics, Marion's phenomenology is an interesting and successful attempt to radicalize phenomenology. Its valuable contribution is reflection on the fundamental principles of phenomenology, which gains value especially in the time of various “applied phenomenologies”. Keywords: gift; givenness; Marion; phenomenology; reduction; saturated phenomenon; subject; INTRODUCTION The phenomenological method was formulated in the early work of Edmund Husserl Logische Untersuchungen (Logical investigations) 1 . Although it was clearly polemical with psychologism and cognitive naturalism, its novum lies in the discovery of the difference between what appears and the appearance itself. Phenomenology is not to deal with the subject sphere, but to appearing itself 2 . However, as demonstrated by Jan Patočka, developed by Husserl in later works, from Ideas 3 to The Crisis 4 , transcendental phenomenology is only one possible implementation of the phenomenological method 5 . It involves a reduction to 1 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1-2, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle, 1913. 2 Philippe Huneman, Estelle Kulich, Introduction à la phénoménologie, Armand Colin, Paris, 1997, p. 18. 3 Edmund Husserl, Ideen ze einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie , Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle, 1913. 4 Edmund Husserl, Die Kreisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie , in: “Philosophia”, Bd. 1, Belgrad, 1936. 5 Jan Patočka, Der Subjektivismus der Husserlschen und die Möglichkeit einer “asubjektiven” Phänomenologie , in: “Philosophische Perspektiven”, 2 (1970), p. 317-334.