11 Brower et al.: Biodiversity compensation compliance Compliance with biodiversity compensation on New Zealand’s public conservation lands Ann Brower*, Laurien Heijs, Ruth Kimani, James Ross and Crile Doscher Department of Environmental Management, Lincoln University, PO Box 84, Lincoln 7647, Canterbury, New Zealand *Author for correspondence (Email: Ann.Brower@lincoln.ac.nz) Published online: 27 November 2017 Abstract: This article assesses compliance with biodiversity compensation on New Zealand’s conservation land. Of the 261 Department of Conservation (DOC) concessions for commercial activity searched, only about 15% included compensation provisions. A sample of 20 concessions of that 15% suggests 68% achieve full compliance. Our results suggest compliance is infuenced by factors such as habitat and activity type, protected area category, and whether a concession holder has pending concessions and/or renewals. Inconsistencies in compliance monitoring, enforcement, and reporting merit attention. Although New Zealand’s rate of full compliance with biodiversity compensation conditions is higher than that observed in other countries, compensation is rarely requested. This rarity and the lack of national guidelines on how and what to ask for in compensation, suggest that compliance with compensation once requested, and the quality and consistency of requests, limit biodiversity protection. Jurisdictions engaging in biodiversity compensation should attend not just to compliance, but also to the requests themselves. To do so, they should develop clear guidelines, enforcement strategies, and reporting processes. Keywords: biodiversity compensation; compliance; concession; Conservation Act; Department of Conservation; enforcement; implementation; monitoring; New Zealand; policy Introduction Biodiversity compensation employs positive conservation actions to mitigate the adverse effects of resource use and development (Burgin 2008; Gordon et al. 2011; Pilgrim et al. 2013). It is a prominent and growing practice on public and private lands around the world (Burgin 2008; Madsen et al. 2011) as it promises to advance development and conservation simultaneously (Ten Kate et al. 2004; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Bull et al. 2013; Linterman 2014). While growing in popularity, biodiversity compensation is fraught with complications, particularly in biodiversity offsets, a subset of compensation (Walker et al. 2009; Maron et al. 2012; Brownlie et al. 2013). One such complication, and our focus, is inadequate compliance monitoring and compliance outcomes (Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Bull et al. 2013). In New Zealand, compliance with compensation is fretted over more than measured (Tonkin and Taylor 2012; Brown et al. 2013; Linterman 2014). A 2017 report by the Environmental Defence Society found that New Zealand’s environmental compliance regimes are less than robust throughout the sector (Brown 2017). This issue represents an unquantifed threat to biodiversity (Bekessy et al. 2010; Brown et al. 2013) and undermines the credibility of biodiversity protection (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). Reasons for poor monitoring and compliance of biodiversity compensation include lack of: (1) a regulatory framework for biodiversity compensation; (2) monitoring resources; (3) clarity in responsibility for monitoring; (4) training in biodiversity compensation monitoring; (5) clear and effective methods for measuring biodiversity; and (6) political will (Walker et al. 2009; Tonkin and Taylor 2012; Rega 2013). Biodiversity compensation occurs ad hoc under two of New Zealand’s most prominent biodiversity laws, the Conservation Act 1987 and the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) (see http://legislation.govt.nz). Currently, there is no national policy guiding implementation and evaluation (Madsen et al. 2011; Brown et al. 2013), but we defned compensation as additional conservation actions that went beyond what would be required under the traditional avoid-remedy-mitigate approach. Brown et al.’s (2013) study was the frst systematic evaluation of compliance with biodiversity compensation on predominantly private land, under the RMA. Ours is the frst study on public conservation land, under the Conservation Act. Administered by the Department of Conservation (DOC), the Conservation Act governs the conservation estate – one third of New Zealand’s landmass. While the Act favours conservation over development on public conservation land, DOC will allow commercial activity in some form through a concession. DOC can place conditions on a concession, requiring compensation or remediation in some form for detrimental effects that were impossible to avoid, remedy, or mitigate (DOC 2014). This article explores geographic, procedural, regulatory and social infuences on compliance, and recommends improvements for compensation to better avoid biodiversity loss. Methods We examined compliance with biodiversity compensation conditions in DOC concessions. An agreement with DOC allowed data collection for no more than 20 concessions, due to time constraints for feld inspections and the commercially sensitive nature of the concessions database. Each of the 20 concession cases required up to fve compensatory conditions, for a total of 32 conditions. We had to exclude four conditions due to insuffcient data. In total, our sample included 28 conditions. New Zealand Journal of Ecology (2018) 42(1): 11-17 © New Zealand Ecological Society. DOI: 10.20417/nzjecol.42.4