the rules of critical scholarship should set the terms for all historical study of religious topics and whether theological considerations must be excluded in pursuit of neutrality. What Levenson writes here seems to me helpful, though he could have written at greater length about the ways in which the claim of neutrality is also a form of lack of self-awareness. Once in a while Levenson makes state- ments about subjects outside his specialty that need as much qualification as he gives those who happen to express themselves about topics within his specialty. Thus he writes of “the weak or non-existent sense of historical change characteristic of pre-Enlightenment thinking everywhere” (13). There is a con- siderable body of scholarship on high medie- val learned recognition of change. Another limitation of the book is that when Levenson refers to Christianity he seems commonly to have Protestantism in mind. Thus he writes, “It is… not surprising that the disputations about grace and works, or faith and works, so divisive of Christian communities over the centuries and so typical of the history of Christian thought into our own time find scant parallel in the Jewish tradition” (58). Yet these disputations are much more charac- teristic of the centuries since Luther than they are of all Christian history. GLENN W. OLSEN University of Utah, USA Glenn.Olsen@utah.edu © 2015, Glenn W. Olsen http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2015.1028013 The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift. By Geir Lundestad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiii + 331 pp. $45.00 paper. Transatlantic relations since 1945 have been the subject of many books. Geir Lundestad has pro- duced a fine, well structured and carefully researched volume which provokes serious thought and offers new insights on how the relationship between the United States and Western Europe after the Second World War shifted from representing an “empire by invita- tion” to “Transatlantic drift.” In the Introduc- tion, Lundestad presents two main arguments. The first is that after 1945 the United States enjoyed an unprecedented position of strength in postwar Europe, which was essential for European recovery. He explains why he sees the American “empire” as being different from past empires. After all, independent countries were preserved and nurtured by the United States and, unlike traditional empires, the American “empire” was not ruled directly from an American imperial capital. In fact, there was no subjugation, but a realization by European elites that American involvement would be crucial for postwar European economic and political reconstruction. The second argument is that, at least in the early postwar years, Eur- ope invited the United States to assume a permanent role in Europe and, even after the Cold War, when the United States reduced its presence, old “invitations” for American engagement were renewed. Chapter 1, just four pages long, analyzes the pre-1945 relationship between the United States and Europe from a historical perspec- tive. The United States we are told, was most reluctant to become entangled in European affairs because of differing views concerning the friendliness and dependability of individ- ual Great Powers and because its political elites, shielded by two oceans, perceived the country to be safe from direct attack. Many saw American intervention in the First World War as a mistake and, even towards the end of the Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt had no desire to become another Woodrow Wilson. Chapters 2 and 3 address the issue of American-West European collaboration. As Lundestad correctly states, collaboration based on the “empire by invitation” concept was established between 1945 and 1950. Between 1950 and 1962, an institutional framework involving collective security (NATO) and Western European integration were supported by the United States in order to counter potential Soviet expansionism in Europe. Lundestad underscores the centrality of West Germany both for collective security and deeper European integration. Both chap- ters analyze the period between 1945 and 1962 in meticulous detail. Chapter 4 deals with President Charles De Gaulle and his challenge to American hegemony. Though France welcomed American involvement in Europe in the early BOOK REVIEWS 569