MULTISCALE BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND MOLAR BEHAVIORISM: AN OVERVIEW WILLIAM M. BAUM UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, AND UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE In the context of evolutionary theory, behavior is the interaction between the organism and its environ- ment. Two implications follow: (a) behavior takes time; and (b) behavior is defined by its function. That behavior takes time implies that behavioral units are temporally extended patterns or activities. An activ- ity functions as an integrated whole composed of parts that are themselves smaller-scale activities. That behavior is defined by its function implies that behavior functions to change the environment in ways that promote reproductive success. Phylogenetically important events (PIEs) are enhanced or mitigated by activities they induce as a result of natural selection. Induction explains all the phenomena that have traditionally been explained by reinforcement. This multiscale view replaces discrete responses and con- tiguity with multiscale activities and covariance. A PIE induces operant activity as a result of covariance in the form of a feedback relation between the activity and the PIE. A signal (conditional inducer) induces PIE-induced activities as a result of covariance between the PIE and the signal. In an ontological per- spective, behavior is a process, and an activity is a process individual. For example, ontological consider- ations clarify the status of delay and probability discounting. A true natural science of behavior is possible. Key words: molar behaviorism, multiscale behavior analysis, time allocation, phylogenetically important event, induction, contingency, class, individual, process This paper aims to bring together a few dis- parate lines of thought into a single cohesive framework for behaviorism and behavior anal- ysis. I originally called the view I was develop- ing “molar” behaviorism, but came to discover that the label “molar” was misleading, because people seemed to assume it only applied to phenomena at long time scales and could not apply to phenomena at short time scales. Fol- lowing Phil Hineline’s suggestion, I began call- ing it the “molar multiscale view,” with the intention that I would eventually just call it the “multiscale view.” By 2013, in a paper, “What counts as behavior: The molar multiscale view,” I was able to put together the time- based view with scale, choice, and evolution. Much of what I have to say has appeared before in print in various places, but I will try in a brief space to weave together the concepts and observations of those earlier writings. The following section summarizes the main con- cepts of multiscale behavior analysis and the topics I will enlarge upon in the paper. Prolegomenon The importance to behavior analysis of mak- ing contact with evolutionary theory can hardly be overstated. Behavior analysis is properly part of biology. It is not a part of psychology, but an alternative to psychology. For psychology, behavior is a superficial phenomenon that must be understood by inferences to a “deeper” level: the mind or the brain. As long as behav- ior is not considered a subject matter in its own right and behavioral phenomena are consid- ered secondary, a true natural science of behav- ior is impossible. Biologists often are naïve about the mind and consciousness, but they have no trouble thinking about behavior as real and primary. When asked, biologists whom I have met agree that behavior is an organism’s interaction with the environment. The organism is not the agent of its behav- ior, but the medium of its behavior. Organ- isms and behavior go hand in hand, because they both enhance the fitness of the genes that promote them. Organisms and behavior would not exist if the genes making for organ- isms were not selected by having greater reproductive success as a result of being located in organisms. The connection to evolution and natural selection allows a rethinking of the concept of reinforcement. Once we recognize that etholo- gists’“fixed action patterns” and the notion of This paper contains portions of the English version of a book chapter published in Portuguese (D. Zillo & K. Carrara (Eds.), Behaviorismos. Vol. 2. Sao Paulo, Brazil: Paradigma). The author thanks Howard Rachlin and Tim Shahan for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Address correspondence to: William M. Baum, 611 Mason Street, #504, San Francisco, CA 94108. Email: billybaum94108@gmail.com doi: 10.1002/jeab.476 JOURNAL OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR 2018, 1–21 © 2018 Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 1