TRUTH RELATIVISTS CAN’T TRUMP MORAL PROGRESS ANNALISA COLIVA Università di Modena and Reggio Emilia and COGITO Research Centre in Philosophy SEBASTIANO MORUZZI Università di Bologna and COGITO Research Centre in Philosophy In this paper, we raise a new challenge for truth-relativism, when applied to moral discourse. 1 In §1, we set out the main tenets of this doctrine; in §2, we canvass two broad forms a relativist project can take: Descriptive Relativism and Revisionary Relativism; in §3, we briefly consider the prospects of the combination of truth-relativism with either project when dealing with disagree- ment arising in the relevant areas of discourse. We claim that truth-relativism faces what we dub “the Lost Disagreement Problem,” while leaving its final assessment for another occasion. In §4, we show how there is another—so far unnoticed—challenge truth-relativists must face when dealing with disputes about morals: we call it “the Progress Problem.” In §5, we show how a recent notion proposed in connection with truth-relativism and the problem of future contingents, namely the idea of trumping, can help relativists make sense of such a problem. Yet, we conclude, in §6, that the appeal to trumping in fact forces a dilemma onto truth-relativists engaged in either a Descriptive or a Revisionary project. §1 The Relativity Thesis It is well known that relativism comes in many forms. The one that, in recent years, has gained center stage is truth-relativism. 2 The basic idea of truth- relativism is that exemplifications of the truth-property 3 can change when different perspectives are adopted. 4 Of course, a lot would need to be said about the bearers of the truth-property and about the notion of a perspective in order to get a clearer grip on the doctrine. For the purposes of this paper, however, it will suffice to say that propositions are the bearers of the truth- 1. It would be an extremely interesting issue, to be pursued in another paper though, whether the challenge we raise for truth-relativism as applied to morals can be extended to truth-relativism when applied to other areas of discourse, such as for instance epistemic discourse. 2. Egan et al. (2005), Kölbel (2002, 2003, 2009), Lasersohn (2005), and MacFarlane (2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008, forthcoming) are prominent examples of recent truth-relativists. 3. It is an interesting and complex question, which, alas, we will have to leave to another occasion, whether a truth-relativist can allow for a deflationary conception of truth. 4. This characterization of relativism is neutral between two forms of context-dependence: so-called “non-indexical contextualism,” according to which two utterances can express the same content in the same world though having different truth-values, and the more radical form of relativism, according to which one and the same utterance can take different truth-values in relation to two different contexts in which it is assessed (see MacFarlane 2009). Analytic Philosophy Vol. 53 No. 1 March 2012 pp. 48–57 48 Analytic Philosophy Vol. 53 No. 1 © 2012 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.