This preprint has not undergone peer review or any post-submission improvements or corrections. The Version of Record of this article is published in Philosophia, and is available online at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-022-00584-y. Please refer to the Version of Record. (For the Version of Record you can also use the following link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365016293_Ideal_Conceivers_the_Nature_of_Modality_and_the_Res ponse-Dependent_Account_of_Modal_Concepts) Ideal Conceivers, the Nature of Modality and the Response-Dependent Account of Modal Concepts Alexandru Dragomir alexandru.dragomir@filosofie.unibuc.ro University of Bucharest Abstract: What grounds the truth of modal statements? And how do we get to know about what is possible or necessary? One of the most prominent anti-realist perspectives on the nature of modality, due to Peter Menzies, is the response-dependent account of modal concepts. Typically, offering a response-dependent account of a concept means defining it in terms of dispositions to elicit certain mental states from suitable agents under suitable circumstances. Menzies grounded possibility and necessity in the conceivability-response of ideal conceivers: P is possible iff an ideal conceiver could conceive that P. I will draw attention to three major objections that can be identified in the modal metaphysics and epistemology literature: Chalmers’ Incoherency Objection, Sherratt’s Transparency Objection and Geirsson’s Irrelevancy Objection. Each of these objections raises a different worry regarding Menzies’ account: that the notion of an ideal conceiver is incoherent, that the account is inconsistent with a trivial connection between actuality and possibility, and that it fails to offer an explanation of our knowledge of modality. The aim of this paper is to defend the response-dependent account of modality against these three objections. Keywords: Conceivability, Modality, Response-Dependency, Epistemology of Modality, Metaphysics of Modality