Social perception and influence of lies vs. bullshit: a test of the insidious bullshit hypothesis John V. Petrocelli 1 & Haley E. Silverman 1 & Samantha X. Shang 1 Accepted: 17 August 2021 # The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021 Abstract Although a ubiquitous social behavior, little is known about bullshitting (i.e., communicating with no regard for truth and/or evidence) and its effects on social perception and influence. Although bullshit and lies are viewed as undesirable, the distinction may have important implications for social influence. Frankfurt’s (1986) insidious bullshit hypothesis (i.e., bullshitting is evaluated less negatively, but more insidious, than lying) is examined in light of social perception (i.e., evaluation and perceived motives; Experiment 1) and social influence (Experiment 2). Results suggest bullshitting is evaluated less negatively than lying and identifies ignorance, dishonesty, and opinion expression as mediators of a bullshit/lie-evaluation link. Furthermore, relative to lies, bullshit appears to have a more potent impact on that which is perceived to be true as well as attitudes formed for novel attitude objects. Keywords Bullshit . Bullshitting . Lying . Social perception . Attitude . Persuasion Bullshitting involves intentionally or unintentionally, con- sciously or unconsciously, communicating with little to no regard or concern for truth, genuine evidence, and/or established semantic, logical, systemic, or empirical knowl- edge (Frankfurt, 1986; Petrocelli, 2018). As such, bullshitting is often characterized by, but not limited to, using rhetorical strategies designed to disregard truth, evidence and/or established knowledge, such as exaggerating or embellishing one’s knowledge, competence, or skills in a particular area or talking about things of which one knows nothing about in order to impress, fit in with, influence, or persuade others. Frankfurt (1986) surmised that bullshit is unavoidable whenever circumstances require one to talk about things he/ she knows little to nothing about. When a person’s obligations to speak about a topic are more extensive than his/her knowl- edge of the facts relevant to that topic, bullshit is often the result. In fact, it is well established that people are perfectly willing to offer judgments and opinions about that which they could not possibly know anything about (e.g., Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). Although people appear to feel obligated to have an opinion about everything, they cannot possibly have an informed opinion about everything, and therefore, bullshit is continually produced (Petrocelli, 2018). Given that bullshitting is almost unavoidable (Allen, Allen, & McGoun, 2012; Frankfurt, 1986; Morgan, 2010), it is surprising that little empirical knowledge about the behavior exists. Although it appears to be an inevitable social behavior and a salient feature of our culture (Law, 2011; Penny, 2005), and bullshit can be misperceived as something profound (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015; Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016; Sterling, Jost, & Pennycook, 2016), the potential utilities of bullshitting remain unexam- ined. A better understanding of the social perception of bull- shit, and its influence on attitudes relative to lies, sheds im- portant light on the potential antecedents and communicative functions of bullshitting behavior. The current investigation examines potential consequences of bullshitting relative to lying and the effects they have on social influence. Bullshitting Vs. Lying Bullshitting is distinct from lying (Frankfurt, 1986). The liar knows the truth and communicates with respect to the goal of detracting others from the facts. On the other hand, the bullshitter has no regard for evidence in support of what he/she believes to be true. In fact, what the bullshitter communicates may be true, but the bullshitter wouldn’t know whether or not he/she is * John V. Petrocelli petrocjv@wfu.edu 1 Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7778, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA Current Psychology https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-021-02243-z