Timm Beichelt Rostyslav Pavlenko Europa-Universität Viadrina National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Große Scharrnstr. 59 School of Policy Analysis 15230 Frankfurt/Oder Voloska str. 8/5, 04070 Kyiv Germany Ukraine Tel. +49 – 335 – 5534 2537 Tel. +38 – 066 – 7346 952 beichelt@euv-frankfurt-o.de rostpav@yahoo.com Presidential Election and Constitutional Reform Version: February 19, 2005 1. Introduction Ukraine, similarly to other European CIS states, even after the Orange Revolution of December 2004, belongs to the "gray zone" between democracy and authoritarianism. 1 Neither regime type is fully consolidated. On the one hand, the abuse of power and cor- ruption are wide-spread, the power system is centralized, checks and balances are often ineffective, human rights are sometimes infringed, the media are biased, and – obvi- ously to be seen in the recent presidential election – the will of the people in elections is not respected by all parts of the political elite. On the other hand, the constitutional framework is officially based on the checks and balances principle, the political system is pluralistic, the opposition is quite active and shows considerable successes during elections, some media provide independent information, civil society is viable and ac- tively developing (Haran/Pavlenko 2004). And, even though after a long and worrisome struggle in November and December 2004, a change in power is possible even with regard to the highest office in the country, the presidency. These last features speak against classifying the system as an outright autocracy. Unfair as the first rounds of the presidential election were called by the OSCE observers, the campaign even at that stage remained competitive and the outcome of the election re- sulted in power change. At the time of finishing this article it must remain open if this change will in the mid-term be accepted by all major players. 2 The citizens proved 1 The authors would like to thank Tania Astashkina and Nadiya Russ from European University Viadrina in Frankfurt(Oder) for their support in assembling material and reviewing an earlier version of this text. 2 The time covered by this text ends on january 31, 2005. Although the mass protests of the "Orange Revolution" have forced the incumbents to agree to repeat the second round of the elections under im- proved legislation and tight international supervision, and reform-oriented candidate Viktor Yushchenko was elected president, the political conflict is still ongoing. One indicator is that the losing side (former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych) refused to recognize its defeat. Moreover, the compromise between the incumbents and the opposition itself implied changing the Constitution – shifting control over the executive from the President to the Premier. The changes are to take effect in late 2005, before the par- liamentary elections. Only after the latter take place, it will be clear what political force gets the parlia-