It Felt Fluent, and I Liked It: Subjective Feeling of Fluency Rather Than Objective Fluency Determines Liking Michael Forster, Helmut Leder, and Ulrich Ansorge University of Vienna According to the processing-fluency explanation of aesthetics, more fluently processed stimuli are preferred (R. Reber, N. Schwarz, & P. Winkielman, 2004, Processing fluency and aesthetic pleasure: Is beauty in the perceiver’s processing experience? Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 8, pp. 364 –382.). In this view, the subjective feeling of ease of processing is considered important, but this has not been directly tested in perceptual processing. In two experiments, we therefore objectively manip- ulated fluency (ease of processing) with subliminal perceptual priming (Study 1) and variations in presentation durations (Study 2). We assessed the impact of objective fluency on feelings of fluency and liking, as well as their interdependence. In line with the processing-fluency account, we found that objectively more fluent images were indeed judged as more fluent and were also liked more. Moreover, differences in liking were even stronger when data were analyzed according to felt fluency. These findings demonstrate that perceptual fluency is not only explicitly felt, it can also be reported and is an important determinant of liking. Keywords: subjective feeling of fluency, perceptual fluency, liking, feeling of ease, ease of processing Every day, we evaluate many things in terms of whether we like them. This occurs, for example, when we choose a soft drink, when we inspect advertisements, or when a new fashion item, artwork, or piece of music appeals to us. Even when we are not explicitly aware of why we like an object, we can judge very easily whether we like it or not. For simple spontaneous preferences, liking often seems to be based on “feeling” rather than on rational decisions or explicit insight. In the present study, we investigate how this “feeling”— or the affec- tive component of the judgment— operates when we perceive and like a stimulus. During stimulus perception, one moderating factor for our liking could be fluency. According to Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman (2004), if an object can be perceived with ease, this easiness or fluency seems to increase our liking of an object (for further reviews see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Thus, according to this concept, people prefer what they experience as fluent, or what they can process fluently. For example, Reber, Winkielman, and Schwarz (1998) have shown that images made more fluent through perceptual priming, higher contrast, or longer presentation duration, were detected faster and preferred over less fluently processed images. Subsequent studies have corrob- orated these findings (see Reber, Schwarz, et al., 2004, for a review), and have shown that, not only objective perceptual increase of pro- cessing fluency, through priming, symmetry, or presentation duration (Reber et al., 1998), but also conceptual manipulations, through higher semantic coherence (Topolinski & Strack, 2009a, 2009b), increase liking. But how does fluency exert its influence on liking? It is assumed that the objective fluency of a perceptual process is accompanied by a subjective experience of fluency (Koriat, 1993), of which humans are not necessarily aware (Reber, Fazendeiro, & Winkielman, 2002). Since “processing fluency is itself hedonically marked and high fluency is subjectively experienced as positive, as indicated by psychophysiological findings” (Reber, Schwarz, et al., 2004, pp. 365–366), this positive experience can subsequently be attributed to an object in the course of automatic object appraisal (Clore, 1992). Accordingly, fluency could exert its influence on our liking through the subjective feelings of ease that accompany the perceptual process. Uncovering the nature and impact of this subjective experience, or subjective feeling of fluency (Reber et al., 2002), is a pivotal issue not only in the fluency literature (“fringes of consciousness”; Reber & Schwarz, 2002; Reber, Wurtz, & Zimmermann, 2004; Topolinski & Strack, 2009b), but also for our understanding of the role and function of consciousness in general (Craig, 2009; Dama- sio, 1999; Rolls, 2000), and of judgments and decision making (“cognitive feelings,” Clore, 1992; Clore et al., 2001). The term “feeling” as a subjective sensation suggests that the experience of fluency could be relatively faint, fleeting, or unspecific. That this feeling can nevertheless lead to a conscious experience of fluency was first proposed by Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992, 1994) in their perceptual fluency/attributional model. Originally proposed as an explanation for the mere-exposure effect (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, 1968), the model also explains the fluency– liking link by proposing that fluency is subjectively experienced as an unspecific feeling, which can become a powerful source in the formation of evaluations and preferences (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). However, in their studies, Bornstein and D’Agostino only assumed and did not test that a subjective feeling had been elicited This article was published Online First October 22, 2012. Michael Forster, Helmut Leder, and Ulrich Ansorge, Department of Basic Psychological Research and Research Methods, Faculty of Psychology, Uni- versity of Vienna, Vienna, Austria. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael Forster, Department of Basic Psychological Research and Research Methods, Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Liebiggasse 5, 1010 Vienna, Austria. E-mail: michael.forster@univie.ac.at This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Emotion © 2012 American Psychological Association 2013, Vol. 13, No. 2, 280 –289 1528-3542/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0030115 280