Yet the Age of Anarchism? Thomas O. Hueglin Queen's University Federalism, consociationalism, and corporatism can be described as concepts of compound majoritarianism in plural societies. In practice, however, these concepts have been criticized as elitist and executive instruments of policymaking and conflict regulation which lack popular control. Linked to the functional ends of regulation in hierarchical industrial systems, they tend to bypass the obsolescent, and majoritarian, institutions of the traditional nation-state. Thus they lose their meaning as conceptual devices for accommodating group interests in complex societies. It is suggested, therefore, that anarchism be added as a fourth and corrective concept of interest intermediation. Anarchism must be understood in its proper historical meaning as a critique of modern etatocentrism. It aims for effective control by the various societal segments over their own affairs. Its conceptual virtues are organized mutualism and horizontal coopera- tion. These virtues are contrasted with the neoconservative rediscovery of anarchism as a logical extension of laissez-faire liberalism. Arend Lijphart's comparative examination of consociationalism and federalism in this issue of Publius leads to the conclusion that these con- cepts overlap to an important extent: "consociationalism plus some addi- tional attributes spells federalism" and vice versa. Being concepts of "non- majoritarian democracy", both federalism and consociationalism differ main- ly with regard to their political form. While aptly redefining the characteristics of federalism and consociationalism as "compound majoritarianism," Daniel J. Elazar comes to a similar conclusion: federalism focuses on compound majoritarianism as a constitutional form, whereas consociationalism refers to the—mostly informal—modes of interest intermediation of a polity's regime. Hence, both concepts look at different aspects of policymaking and conflict regulation in plural societies. Kenneth McRae has suggested, therefore, that corporatism be included in this comparative scheme. 1 All three concepts appear to highlight a growing incongruence between the fragmented nature of interest intermediation in highly complex societal systems, and the institutional tidiness of their constitutional order. Bypass- ing a democratic mechanism "the potential of which for creating unity has become highly doubtful," both consociational bargaining and corporatist concertation seek to establish a "substitute consensus" through a "highly informal process of negotiation among representatives of strategic groups within the public and the private sectors." 2 Similarly, the cooperative trends 'Kenneth D. McRae, "Comment: Federation, Consociation, Corporatism—An Addendum to Arend Lijphart," Canadian Political Science Review 12 (September 1979): 517-522. 2 Claus Offe, "The Separation of Form and Content in Liberal Democratic Politics," Studies in Political Economy 3 (Spring 1980): 9. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 15 (Spring 1985) « CSF Associates, Philadelphia 101