I INTRODUCTION This paper outlines an economic model of paramilitary behaviour in Northern Ireland (NI). Both nationalist and loyalist paramilitaries have come to resemble profit-making business enterprises through large-scale black market activity (see Clare, 1990; Dillon, 1991; Maguire, 1993; Anderson, 1994), and violence is their method of advertising their strength. This fits precisely with the Tullock (1971) perspective that an individual would join these organisations for material benefits. In addition, the incentive of belonging to a social network and the feeling of power would also be important psychological factors in the cost- benefit calculation. The key point is that NI violence takes on more of the characteristics of gangsterism than of a revolutionary uprising. Tullock (1971) used a rigorous economic argument to show the high degree of falsity behind the concept of idealism as a collective driving force for political violence. For Tullock the decision to rebel is the outcome of a private- cost benefit calculation. His position is extremely simple when considered from an economist’s perspective as it relates strongly to the theory of public goods; Tullock was frustrated that the bulk of analysis regarding rebellion put forward the pursuit of a public good as its primary cause. For Tullock this is illogical or 294 Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 45, No. 3, August 1998 © Scottish Economic Society 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA AN ECONOMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT Colin C. Jennings* ABSTRACT Tullock (1971) demonstrated that the causes of political rebellion are perhaps more to do with private expected utility than collective discontent. There is much to suggest that pecuniary motivation plays a large part in the Northern Ireland (NI) conflict given the substantial amount of ‘black market’ activity which is present. This paper therefore puts forward an economic model of the NI paramilitaries blending their gangster and political activities which are commonly geared to earn revenue. From this model an explanation from an economic perspective emerges as to why a cease-fire may occur and why it is unstable. The implications of the model are then investigated, with particular reference to conflict solutions arising from the economic model rather than political diplomacy. * University of Portsmouth