American Economic Review 2016, 106(8): 2371–2405 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130874 2371 Monitoring Corruptible Politicians † By Gustavo J. Bobonis, Luis R. Cámara Fuertes, and Rainer Schwabe* Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal gov- ernments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these beneft from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to offce. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments. (JEL D72, H83, K42, O17) In a well-functioning representative democracy, citizens select publicly motivated and competent politicians to administer public affairs and hold them accountable for their performance. To succeed in these tasks, citizens must have appropriate infor- mation about candidates’ characters, abilities, and actions while in offce (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Besley 2006). Accordingly, a growing body of research fnds that voters’ access to evaluations of politician performance enhances government responsiveness, reduces corruption and rent-seeking behaviors, and pro- motes electoral accountability in the short run. 1 However, it is not well understood whether monitoring and information dissemination policies can generate a sustained 1 For evidence regarding government responsiveness, see, e.g., Besley and Burgess (2002) and Björkman and Svensson (2009); regarding corruption and rent-seeking behaviors, see, e.g., Reinikka and Svensson (2005) and Olken (2007); regarding electoral accountability, see, e.g., Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Banerjee et al (2011). * Bobonis: Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G7, Canada, and BREAD (e-mail: gustavo.bobonis@utoronto.ca); Cámara Fuertes: Department of Political Science, University of Puerto Rico-Río Piedras, PO Box 23445, San Juan, PR 00931 (e-mail: luisraulcamara@gmail.com); Schwabe: Cornerstone Research, 599 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10022 (e-mail: rschwabe@cornerstone. com). This is a revised version of earlier drafts circulated with the titles “The Dynamic Effects of Information on Political Corruption: Theory and Evidence from Puerto Rico” and “Does Exposing Corrupt Politicians Reduce Corruption?” We thank Tim Besley, Matilde Bombardini, Leah Brooks, Adriana Camacho, Steve Coate, Taryn Dinkelman, Claudio Ferraz, Fred Finan, Steven Haider, Anke Kessler, Monica Martínez-Bravo, Torsten Persson, Nancy Qian, Imran Rasul, Aloysius Siow, Alessandro Tarozzi, Duncan Thomas, Pedro Vicente, and numerous sem- inar and conference participants. We are especially grateful to Hon. José M. Díaz Saldaña, Comptroller of Puerto Rico, for providing us access to the municipal government audit reports of the Offce of the Comptroller of Puerto Rico, and to Fred Finan for invaluable help and advice in the construction of the audit reports data. Aileen Cardona, Laura Delgado, María del Mar Ortiz, Zorimar Rivera, Vilma López, Adriana Robertson, Julie Wilson, and Xin Zhao provided superb research assistance. Research support from the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), and the University of Puerto Rico Social Research Center and Offce of the Dean for Graduate Studies and Research is gratefully acknowledged. We are responsible for any errors. † Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130874 to visit the article page for additional materials and author disclosure statement(s).