r Academy of Management Journal 2017, Vol. 60, No. 5, 1963–1985. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2014.0512 SHADY CHARACTERS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF ILLICIT ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES FOR RESILIENT TEAM PERFORMANCE H. COLLEEN STUART Johns Hopkins University CELIA MOORE Bocconi University In this paper we theorize about illicit roles and explore their effects on resilient team performance. We define an illicit role as one whose occupants specialize in activity forbidden by the law, regulatory bodies, or professional societies, in the belief that doing so provides a competitive advantage. Using longitudinal data on professional hockey teams, we examine the enforcer—a player who specializes in the prohibited activity of fighting. We find that team performance is more disrupted by the injury of an enforcer than by the injury of occupants of other formal roles on the team. In addition, team performance recovers more slowly after this setback to the extent the team tries to replace an enforcer, and the performance disruptions associated with his exit are magnified as a function of his experience with his team. We use these findings to develop new theory about organizational roles that operate outside official channels and formal structures. We suggest that such role occupants are more difficult to replace than their formal counterparts, in part because to enact these roles effectively requires experience in the local social context. In the film Michael Clayton, George Clooney plays a lawyer who spends his time on activities that further the firm’s interests but are prohibited, underhanded, or outside the bounds of the law. He elicits preferen- tial treatment from Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents and negotiates surreptitiously with prosecutors as a representative of the defense, actions that could trigger formal sanctions or disbar- ment if discovered. Other lawyers at the firm have official roles indicated by rank (associate, partner) and domain (family law, litigation), and though his col- leagues are aware of what Clayton does, he has no formal title or position within the organizational structure to indicate what that is. When he complains that an upcoming merger makes him vulnerable be- cause the new owners will not understand his role in the firm, the head of the firm replies, “Everyone knows how valuable you are, Michael. Everybody who needs to know. Anybody can go to court. That’s not special. At what you do, you’re great. You have a place. You made a niche for yourself” (Gilroy, 2007). Michael Clayton fulfilled an illicit organizational role in his law firm. We define illicit roles as roles that specialize in activities forbidden by law, regu- latory bodies, or professional societies, in the belief that doing so provides a competitive advantage. In this paper, we develop theory about the character- istics and importance of this type of role in organi- zations. We propose that the departure of illicit role occupants is particularly disruptive to the teams in which they operate. We argue that, in part, this is because there are few credible and capable re- placements for occupants of illicit roles. Thus, efforts to replace illicit role occupants will slow a team’s recovery in the wake of their departure. We further propose that because illicit role occupants require We wish to thank Aparna Joshi and the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback throughout this process. We also thank the members of the Organizational Behavior Research Lab at Harvard Business School, partici- pants at the 2011 INGRoup Conference, and seminar partic- ipants at the University of Utah, Imperial College, University of Michigan, Darden School of Business, Boston College, European School of Management Technology (ESMT), Boc- coni University, Pennsylvania State University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, McGill University, and Cor- nell University for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Robin Ely, Lakshmi Ramarajan, Brad Staats, Jennifer Mueller, Drew Carton, Jordan Cushing, and David MacPhie also provided helpful feedback, and Andrew Thomas, May Ann Guingania and Wiley Wakeman provided enormous help with data collection. 1963 Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyright holder’s express written permission. Users may print, download, or email articles for individual use only.