On the mechanics of kleptocratic states Soeren Henn * Laura Paler † Wilson Prichard ‡ Cyrus Samii § Ra´ ul S´ anchez de la Sierra ¶ March 7, 2017 Preliminary draft — do not circulate Abstract Powerful state administrators can take advantage of their positions to extract re- sources, especially when political accountability is broken. We conjecture that admin- istrators’ power depends on their ability to inflict harm using the power of office, their ability to mobilize powerful networks, and on their privileged access to information. Measuring transfers to administrators is challenging, because they often involve secrecy, and surveys often draw on recall. To circumvent this challenge, we develop a smart phone application, and provide an opportunity for 400 households and small businesses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to privately report every day the universe of payments made during 5 months. We also deploy three randomized interventions aimed to affect the balance of power between administrators and households. First, since administrators systematically take advantage of a tax code that is extremely con- fusing, we organize pro-bono weekly tax consulting to a group of households. Second, to affect the bargaining power that stems from unequal access to social networks, we extend a link from a reputed civil society organization to randomly selected citizens. The organization uses its political leverage to protect the selected citizens. These treat- ments were coupled with a city-wide campaign to expose administrators known to have committed abuses in a random sample of neighborhoods. This document develops the theoretical framework and analysis plan. ∗ Ph.D candidate, Harvard University † Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh. ‡ Professor, University of Toronto. § Assistant Professor, New York University. ¶ Assistant Professor, UC Berkeley. We are grateful for generous funding from the UK Department For International Development, D.R.C. office, and to the Institute of Development Studies (University of Sussex) and the International Center for Taxation and Development for invaluable administrative support. This project would not have been possible without the excellent research assistance of Aimable Amani Lameke, Pablo Argote, Vanessa van den Boogart Anne Degrave, Kailee Jordan, Gabriel Kotchikpa Lawin, and Kailash Rajah. We thank Christian Mastaki for his loyal support and for his knowledge on human resource management. 1