In localizing any cognitive or behavioral event in terms of brain function, we have suggested that the brain be visualized as a mobile (Keenan, 2001). With millions of neurons and billions of connections, the brain lies in a precarious balance. The brain, often perceived as being composed of ‘modules’, ‘areas’, and ‘regions’, is a highly dynamic and integrated system. Like the mobile, distal activity can affect discrete elements. Disruption to a module is rarely an isolated event, even if such disturbance lies below our ability to detect such effects. The brain exists in a balance based on interconnectivity. Such an analogy is prudent when attempting to exact any given phenomena to its brain underpinnings. In particular, when describing complex cognitive events, one must keep in mind that modules of the brain do not exist in isolation. Even when describing events on the level of hemispheric differences, which we will do, it is acknowledged and encouraged to view the brain as an entire entity such that we consider both the distal and proximal occurrences of phenomena. In terms of consciousness, this view is a necessity. Researchers who are interested in localizing consciousness must relate two complex phenomena. The brain, certainly one of the least understood ‘phenomena’ in our universe, defies even more than a basic description. In terms of consciousness, the second of the elusive phenomena, we are also faced with a difficult task involving description. There are seemingly as many definitions of consciousness as there are ‘consciousness researchers’. Therefore, precision in our definitions and measurements is critical to any researcher attempting to investigate the brain correlates of consciousness. If one examines the definition of consciousness in the Oxford Dictionary (3rd ed.), three basic concepts emerge. The first concept relates to what can be viewed as a ‘medical definition’. Here an individual is considered conscious if he or she is aware of any stimuli, internal or external. Conversely, an individual who is unconscious under this category would not be aware of events such as flashing lights or the sound of a voice. He or she would likely be unaware of his or her own thoughts, and such ‘consciousness’ is typically graded on scales that are used to assess basic autonomic functions. Further, we imagine that all animals, at some level, have this ‘medical’ consciousness. The two other definitions of consciousness can be ascribed the term ‘higher-order consciousness’. The first involves a knowledge or awareness of one’s inner thoughts or knowing that the self, is a separate, individual, entity. Related to this is the final definition which involves a co-knowing, or a shared, mutual knowledge. These definitions of higher-order consciousness relate to two common constructs in psychology: Self-awareness and Theory of Mind. Self-awareness involves being aware of one’s own thoughts, or mental state. It includes having the ability to reflect on one’s own cognitions. Further, self-awareness includes the ability to think about oneself as an entity in the third person, allowing for imagining oneself in the future or in the past. Theory of Mind can be referred to as mental state attribution or mindreading. Theory of Mind involves the recognition that other minds are possible, and the individual may be privy to thoughts of another. SELF-RECOGNITION AND SELF-AWARENESS In 1970, Gallup published one of the most important findings in consciousness research. Shaving in his bathroom, Gallup wondered if other Cortex, (2005) 41, 695-704 SPECIAL ISSUE: ORIGINAL ARTICLE THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE AND THE DARK SIDE OF CONSCIOUSNESS Julian P. Keenan, Jennifer Rubio, Connie Racioppi, Amanda Johnson and Allyson Barnacz (Cognitive Neuroimaging Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Montclair State University, Montclair, NJ, USA) ABSTRACT Self-awareness and Theory of Mind comprise the main elements of higher-order consciousness. In attempting to localize these abilities, it appears that regions of the right hemisphere including fronto-temporal regions are capable of sustaining a sense of self-awareness. The right hemisphere appears dominant for tasks involving Theory of Mind as well as deception, which may be important for understanding the brain and laterality in terms of evolution. These findings are critical for our understanding of hemispheric differences in terms of higher-order consciousness. Key words: self-awareness, consciousness, right hemisphere, deception, evolutionary, cognitive neuroscience