83 REVIEWS Bowler, Shaun and Donovan, Todd: THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL REFORM. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. 164 pages. DOI: 10.5817/PC2016-1-83 Electoral systems studies are now experienc- ing a new level of evolutionary development. Tis area of political science has only recently moved from the narrow focus on the conse- quences of their mechanical arrangements towards a much more heterogeneous per- spective in which the components of electoral systems are only one of the variables within a huge array of others, more or less closely sur- rounding the voters, which jointly afect the electoral outcomes. Tis is precisely the theo- retical perspective in which Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan evaluate the ability of electoral system manipulations to meet the theoretical expectations based on implemented changes in electoral mechanisms in their distinctively titled book Te Limits of Electoral Reform. Bowler and Donovan admit from the very beginning that electoral arrangements fall into the category of zero sum redistributive rules that divide competitors into winners and los- ers. Since the border between these two groups is very dependent on the exact procedure of transforming votes into mandates, there is nothing substantially wrong with the self-in- terested interpretation of policy clashes over a particular formula, even if we see no selfsh defense of someone’s own political interests in- cluded in the public debates. Te authors put particular emphasis on the claim that this ap- proach is insufcient. An incumbent’s self-in- terest may be necessary but it is not sufcient to produce reform. Tat is the reason why the sole consideration of hypothetical benefts for proponents of the electoral reform is defcient, while the plausibility of gaining the approval and support manifested in public opinion is much more important. According to Bowler and Donovan, all of the achievable ideas about changing the electoral rules rely on sustaina- ble fostering on the part of the electorate and, moreover, sometimes public pressure can be so strong that even proposals opposing the self-in- terest of political actors could be adopted. Te weakest part of this argumentation lies in the assumption that voters are not only interested, but they also deeply understand the consequences of electoral reforms. Te au- thors consider the self-interested perception of individual rationality as well as social psychol- ogy focused on the role of institutional and social structures surrounding the actors and, through the empirical data, they reliably con- clude that members of the public could back the selfsh orientation when choosing whether to support or oppose the change, or at least ful- ly consciously follow the position of the elites to which they are attached for some reason. Tis way of considering social phenom- ena is rather new among the thoughts about electoral reforms. Tis is why Bowler and Do- novan are very precise while developing the theoretical framework from the beginning of the book. During the frst three chapters, they develop a precise defnition of electoral reform, analyzing the position of elites as well as citizens during the process, and the means of connection of these two groups through public discourse. Tey place a large amount of attention not only on the proper development of theoretical reasoning but also on the em- pirical defense of the assumptions of their ar- gumentation. Nevertheless, their thoughts are analogous to the other areas of social science research that is increasingly incorporating all sorts of context variables surrounding the ten- dencies and trends they try to explain.